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THE ABA GUIDELINES:
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Russell Stetler*
Aurilie Tabuteau**

I.

INTRODUCTION

Some criminal defense lawyers are justly proud to boast to their
clients that they can offer the best defense that money can buy. Others
represent only indigent clients. Clients facing the death penalty are
invariably poor. The standards that have developed in capital defense
practice reflect the strategies, experiential expertise, and collective
wisdom of the public defenders, court-appointed panel lawyers, lowsalaried lawyers from nonprofits, and pro bono volunteers who have
represented indigent capital defendants successfully. In this Article, we
review how the standards of practice in the development of mitigating
evidence-a core component of capital defense practice-evolved from
the reinstatement of the death penalty in the 1970s,1 to the publication of
the original edition of the American Bar Association ("ABA")
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases ("Guidelines") 2 in 1989.
* Russell Stetler is the National Mitigation Coordinator for the federal death penalty
projects. He is based at the office of the Federal Public Defender in Oakland, California. The views
expressed in this Article are his own.
** Aurdlie Tabuteau interned with the National Mitigation Project in 2012 and 2013. She
received her master's degree in Public Affairs from the Institut d'ltudes Politiques (Sciences Po.) in
Paris in 2014.
1. See generally EvAN J. MANDERY, A WILD JUSTICE: THE DEATH AND RESURRECTION OF
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (2013) (discussing the history of Supreme Court cases in the
1970s that first voided all existing death penalty statutes, and then found new guided-discretion
statutes constitutional).
2. ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH
PENALTY
CASES
(1989)
[hereinafter
ABA
GUIDELINES
(1989)],
available at
www.ambar.org/1989Guidelines. These guidelines were later revised in 2003. See ABA
GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH
PENALTY CASES (rev. ed. 2003), in 31 HOFSTRA L. REv. 913 (2003) [hereinafter ABA

GUIDELINES],

available at http://www.ambar.org/2003Guidelines.
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The need for this historical perspective stems from the occasional
inaccurate suggestion that the Guidelines are the work of elite high paid
professionals, or the musings of academics with no grounding in actual
practice. In his concurrence in Bobby v. Van Hook,3 Justice Alito
disparaged the Guidelines as having no "special relevance" to Sixth
Amendment performance standards. 4 He described the ABA as a
"private group with limited membership," whose views-"not to
mention the views of the members of the advisory committee that
formulated the 2003 Guidelines"-"do not necessarily reflect the views
of the American bar as a whole. 5 Thus, the Guidelines, in the Justice's
opinion, do not merit a "privileged position" in determining the
obligations of capital defense counsel.6 No other Justice joined in this
concurrence, but the Court's majority faulted the Sixth Circuit for
judging trial counsel's performance in the 1980s based on revised
Guidelines published in 2003 "without even pausing to consider
whether they reflected the prevailing professional practice at the time of
the trial." 7
Historical clarification is also particularly important today because
of the funding crises in our courts, causing even less hostile jurists to
express anxiety about how much justice we can afford. On the occasion
of an event celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of Gideon v. Wainwright,8
the landmark ruling recognizing that indigent defendants are entitled to a
lawyer at public expense, Justice Kagan gave a speech reminding us that
poor people are not entitled to "the best defense money can buy."'9 She
resorted to the familiar automotive metaphor to remind everyone that a
poor person's right to counsel means only an inexpensive defense-in

enormous effort by the ABA Death Penalty Representation Project ("Project"), which recruited the
advisory committee, worked with it, assisted contractors in drafting revisions and with Professor
Eric Freedman in preparing the Commentary, and finally shepherding the revised Guidelines
through the ABA's internal review process. The result is the singular accomplishment of the Project
over the preceding decade.
3. 558 U.S. 4 (2009) (per curiam).
4. Id.at 13-14 (Alito, J., concurring).
5. Id. at 14.
6. Id.
7. Id.at 7-8 (majority opinion).
8. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (establishing indigent defendants' right to counsel in state court
criminal cases).
9. Id.; Andrew Ramonas, Kagan, Holder Address the Five Decades Since Historic Gideon

Decision, BLT: BLOG LEGAL TIMES (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2013/
03/kagan-holder-address-the-five-decades-since-historic-gideon-decision.html;
Debra Cassens
Weiss,

Kagan Says

Poor Defendants Are

Entitled

to

a

"'Ford Taurus"

Defense,

A.B.A. J.
(Mar.
19,
2013,
12:00
PM),
http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/
kagansays_poor defendants are entitled to a fordtaurus defense.
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car terms, something like a Ford Taurus, not a Cadillac. ° She said: "We
don't have the resources to make [a Cadillac defense] happen ..... And
I'm not sure if we did have the resources that that's exactly what we
should want."'" Justice Kagan continued by stating: "[L]awyers in
criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.' 2 Unfortunately, some
courts and legislatures still view a poor defendant's entitlement to legal
representation as a constitutional extravagance--even when that indigent
person's life is at stake.
II. THE EFFECTIVE RESPONSE TO THE
POST-FURM4N V. GEORGIA FRAMEWORK
13
In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Furman v. Georgia,
which struck down all then existing death penalty statutes.' 4 Most of the
states that had the death penalty on their books immediately enacted new
capital punishment statutes that attempted to address the Court's
concerns by eliminating arbitrariness. 5 By 1976, five of the new statutes
had reached the Supreme Court.' 6 North Carolina and Louisiana had
attempted to eliminate jurors' unfettered discretion by making the death
penalty mandatory for certain narrowly defined murders, but the high
court declared their mandatory statutes unconstitutional. 7 In striking
down the mandatory statutes, the Court explained that individualized
sentencing is constitutionally required in capital cases:

A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the
character and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of
the particular offense excludes from consideration in fixing the
ultimate punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or
mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind. It
10. Ramonas, supranote 9.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
14. Id. at 239-40 (finding the death penalty arbitrary and unconstitutional as applied when
jurors have unfettered discretion to impose it).
15. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-81 (1976) (noting that at least thirty-five states
had enacted new death penalty statutes).
16. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 161-62; Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 328-31 (1976); Jurek
v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 267-68 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 246-47 (1976); Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 285-87 (1976).
17. Roberts, 428 U.S. at 328-31; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 285-87; see MANDERY, supra note 1,
at 336-53 (discussing how the Court chose which cases to review, and how individual Justices
analyzed them). But see DAvID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY IN

AN AGE OF ABOLITION 378 n.4 (2010) ("That each of these five cases involved a white defendant
suggests that the avoidance of race discrimination issues may also have been a factor in the
selection.").
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treats all persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely
individual human beings, but as members of a faceless,
undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the
penalty of death ....
While the prevailing practice of individualizing sentencing
determinations generally reflects simply enlightened policy rather than
a constitutional imperative, we believe that in capital cases the
fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment,
[] requires consideration of the character and record of the individual
offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a
constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the
penalty of death.

The new statutory frameworks of Georgia, Florida, and Texas,
however,

survived

Supreme

Court

scrutiny.

9

All three

statutes

guaranteed that death-sentenced prisoners would have an automatic
appeal to their highest state courts.20 All three established bifurcated
trials, with one phase to determine whether the defendant was guilty of
the alleged capital murder, and a second phase to determine the
22
the Court praised the framework
sentence.21 In Gregg v. Georgia,

proposed in the Model Penal Code in 1962, whereby jurors would be
guided by defined aggravating factors, narrowing eligibility for the death
penalty, and mitigating factors that would offer broad leeway to dispense
mercy.23 As Professor Craig Haney has astutely pointed out, "there was

Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (citation omitted).
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 207; Jurek, 428 U.S. at 268; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 259-60; see also
MANDERY, supra note 1, at 439-40 (noting that Justice Stevens later regretted the decision in Jurek,
stating in a post-retirement interview: "I think upon reflection, we should have held the Texas
statute-which was challenged in the fifth case-to fit under the mandatory category and be
unconstitutional. In my judgment, we made a mistake on that case.").
20. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 166-67; Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 250.
21. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 158; Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 250.
18.
19.

22. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
23. Id. at 191-92 (quoting the Model Penal Code: "The obvious solution.., is to bifurcate the
proceeding, abiding strictly by the rules of evidence until and unless there is a conviction, but once
guilt has been determined opening the record to the further information that is relevant to
sentence."). Once the Court approved the Georgia statute, "the [Model Penal Code] became the
basis, essentially, for every American death penalty statute." MANDERY, supra note 1, at 306; see
ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 2, Guideline 10.11, at 1059 n.274 ("In fact, most statutory mitigating
circumstances, which were typically adapted from the Model Penal Code, are 'imperfect' versions
of first phase defenses such as insanity, diminished capacity, duress, and self-defense."). It should
be noted, however, that this language was later explicitly withdrawn from the Model Penal Code. In
2009, the American Law Institute Council ("Institute") voted "overwhelmingly" to accept the
resolution adopted by the Institute's membership at its annual meeting to withdraw the relevant
section of the Model Penal Code "in light of the current intractable institutional and structural
obstacles to ensuring a minimally adequate system for administering capital punishment." See Press

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol43/iss3/5
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literally no mitigation whatsoever presented to the jurors" who had
sentenced Troy Gregg to death, and this absence of mitigation was
"apparently so insignificant to the Justices" that "not one of them saw fit
to mention it anywhere in their opinions., 24 He notes the particular irony
in Gregg, because "'mitigation' was explicitly identified as one of the
key components in the new and improved death penalty statutes that the
Court found constitutional. 2 5
It is not surprising that some lawyers were initially confused about
what could be presented as mitigating evidence. In the syllabus of a
1978 "Strategy Seminar on Death Penalty Trials" in California, one
veteran public defender wrote:
Most of the doubt and uncertainty lies within the penalty phase.
Although strong arguments can be made for allowing the defendant to
produce evidence going to such matters as common mercy,
defendant's total value within the community, his character, history,
and background, the more strict and severe interpretation is
one that admits the production of evidence of only specifically
enumerated factors. Large wars can be expected to be waged in that
never-never land falling between paragraph one with its broad
expansive admissions
of proofs and paragraph five with its rather
26
stringent limitations.
Just a few months later, the Supreme Court provided clarification in
a case from Ohio. Sandra Lockett challenged the constitutionality of an
Ohio statute because it did not permit the sentencing judge to consider,
as mitigating factors, her character, prior record, age, lack of specific
intent to cause death, and relatively minor role in the crime. 27 The Court
concluded that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the

Release, Am. Law Inst., Message from Director Lance Liebman (on file with the Hofstra Law
Review).
24. Craig Haney, Evolving Standardsof Decency: Advancing the Natureand Logic of Capital
Mitigation, 36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 835, 835-36 (2008).
25. Id. at 836.
26. James Jenner, The California Death Penalty: Trial Tactical Considerations, in
CALIFORNIA ATrORNEYS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN COOPERATION WITH CALIFORNIA PUBLIC
DEFENDERS ASSOCIATION, STRATEGY SEMINAR ON DEATH PENALTY TRIALS, Hastings College of

the Law, San Francisco, Mar. 24-25, 1978, at 15-16, 24 (referring to then Calif. Penal Code § 190.3,
in which 1 provided for any evidence relevant to mitigation, while 5 enumerated only ten
specific factors which the trier "shall take into account"). There was similar confusion in other
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Verlin R. F. Meinz & Mark Schuster, Mitigation Under the Illinois Death
Penalty Act, ILL. B.J., June 1981, at 606, 606, 608, 611-12 (noting tension between the statutory list
of mitigating factors and the broader right to present other mitigating facts, as well as the vagueness

of an "extreme mental or emotional disturbance" that is "not such as would constitute a defense to
prosecution").
27. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 597 (1978).
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sentencer "not be precluded from considering, as a mitigatingfactor,
any aspect of defendant's character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death."28
Meanwhile, practitioners in the South were aggressively developing
strategies to investigate and present effective mitigating evidence-and
embracing multidisciplinary teamwork as early as 1976.29 Dennis N.
Balske, an attorney then practicing with the Southern Poverty Law
Center in Alabama, also stressed the need for teams in a 1979 law
review article:
No attorney should ever solo a capital case. There are simply too many
things going on for one attorney to manage. Moreover, it is difficult to
maintain one's sanity under such intense pressure without the support
of another attorney. Thus, as an absolute
minimum, every capital case
30
should have two defense attorneys.
The article also emphasized the importance of investigation,3 1 consistent
theories in both phases,32 and preparation of penalty phase strategy and
evidence far in advance of trial, so that "rather than scurrying around to
discover information to save your client, your job will consist of
administering the most persuasive presentation possible from the wealth
of information already accumulated, in such a way as to complement,
through consistency, your trial presentation. 3 3 Balske also appreciated
28. Id. at 604.
29. See Jill Miller, The Defense Team in Capital Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1117, 1123 &
n.51 (2003) ("Millard Farmer, an attorney who assisted with the Team Defense Project in Georgia
in 1976, was one of the first to articulate the team concept in capital defense work. The project
employed an interdisciplinary approach and strategies that reached beyond the courtroom in
representing its clients." (footnote omitted)); see also Michael G. Millman, Interview: Millard
Farmer,FORUM, Nov.-Dec. 1984, at 31, 31-32; Team Defense Project, Team Defense in Capital
Cases, FORUM, May-June 1978, at 24, 24.
30. Dennis N. Balske, New Strategiesfor the Defense of Capital Cases, 13 AKRON L. REv.
331, 336 (1979). By 1982, Balske's admonition never to "solo" a capital case was successfully
litigated by a court-appointed lawyer in California. See Keenan v. Superior Court of S.F., 640 P.2d
108, 113-14 (Cal. 1982) (granting mandamus to compel appointment of second counsel because of
complex factual and legal issues in capital case); see also ABA GUIDELINES (1989), supra note 2,
Guideline 2.1 (requiring two qualified attorneys at trial, on appeal, and in post-conviction).
31. Balske, supra note 30, at 352; see also ABA GUIDELINES (1989), supra note 2, Guideline
11.4.1 (requiring that "independent investigations relating to the guilt/innocence phase and to the
penalty phase of a capital trial" should begin "immediately upon counsel's entry into the case and
should be pursued expeditiously").
32. Balske, supra note 30, at 353; see also ABA GUIDELINES (1989), supra note 2, Guideline
11.7.1(A)-(B) (requiring counsel to formulate a defense theory "that will be effective through both
phases," and seek to minimize inconsistencies).
33. Balske, supra note 30, at 353-54; see also ABA GUIDELINES (1989), supra note 2,
Guideline 11.8.3(A) (requiring sentencing preparation to commence "immediately upon counsel's
entry into the case").

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol43/iss3/5
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the power of transformative stories of redemption, so he did not imagine
mitigation as being limited to the client's pre-offense background:
"Importantly, the life story must be complete. That is, it3 4must include
information up to the day of the sentencing hearing itself.
The details of teamwork also quickly evolved. It was not long
before lawyers appreciated the value of having someone give undivided
attention to the client and the development of mitigating evidence. One
lawyer in California hired a former New York Times reporter to
investigate the life history of his client. The reporter, Lacey Fosburgh,
was teaching at the Journalism School at the University of California,
Berkeley, and she had previously written Closing Time: The True Story

of the "Goodbar" Murder, a best seller about a case that she had
covered for the newspaper.3 5 Her account of her experience assisting in
the successful representation of a capital client was published in 1982:
[A] significant legal blind spot existed between the roles played by the
private investigator and the psychiatrist, the two standard informationgetters in the trial process. Neither one was suited to the task at hand
here-namely discovering and then communicating the complex
human reality of the defendant's personality in a sympathetic way.
Significantly, the defendant's personal history and family life, his
obsessions, aspirations, hopes, and flaws, are rarely a matter of
physical evidence. Instead they are both discovered and portrayed
through narrative, incident, scene, memory, language, style, and even a
whole array of intangibles like eye contact, body movement, patterns
of speech-things that to a jury convey as much information, if not
more, as any set of facts. But all of this is hard to recognize or develop,
understand or systematize without someone on the defense team
having it as his specific function. This person should have nothing else

to do but work with the defendant, his family, friends, enemies,
business associates and casual acquaintances, perhaps even duplicating
that and
some of what the private detective does, but going beyond
patience. 36

looking for more. This takes a lot of time and

34. Balske, supra note 30, at 357-58; see also ABA GUIDELINES (1989), supra note 2,
Guideline 11.8.6(A)-(B) (noting that counsel should consider presenting evidence of the
"rehabilitative potential of the client," in addition to information from his medical, educational,
military, employment, family, and social history); see also Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 45 (1985) (evidence of positive jail adjustment is relevant as mitigation, even though it "would not
relate specifically to petitioner's culpability for the crime he committed").
35. See generally LACEY FOSBURGH, CLOSING TIME: THE TRUE STORY OF THE "GOODBAR"
MURDER (1977).
36. Lacey Fosburgh, The Nelson Case: A Model for a New Approach to Capital Trials,
FORUM, Sept.-Oct. 1982, at 31, 32 (emphasis added).
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By the mid-1980s, there was also increasing recognition of the need
for multidisciplinary teams, including nonlawyers, who would give
fulltime attention to social history investigation.3 7 In 1986, social
workers Cessie Alfonso and Katharine Baur wrote about their
experience in capital defense teams over the preceding five years,
"bridg[ing] the gap" between attorneys and clients' families, fostering
closer cooperation between clients and attorneys, and using psychosocial
expertise to help shape the mitigation narrative.38 Attorneys David C.
Stebbins and Scott P. Kenney reiterated the importance of capital
defense counsel being team players, and bluntly acknowledged that
lawyers just do not have the "psycho-social" expertise that mitigation
work requires. 39 They stressed the importance of parallel tracks of
investigation: "Upon appointment to a capital case, two concurrent
investigations should be begun by separate and distinct investigatory
personnel. The criminal investigation is self-explanatory. A social
investigation or social history is a creature of capital litigation, however,
and is a key to a successful mitigation., 40 Stebbins and Kenney also
noted how social history is the key to reliable mental health assessments
in capital cases: "Without a complete social history, any psychological
examination is incomplete and the resulting opinions, conclusions, or
diagnoses are subject to severe scrutiny., 41 Another article in 1987
concluded: "The mitigation specialist is a professional who, as attorneys
across the nation are recognizing, should be included and will be
primary to the defense team. 4 2 These authors also stressed the
importance of engaging the services of a mitigation specialist at the
37. See, e.g., Cessie Alfonso & Katharine Baur, Enhancing Capital Defense: The Role of the
ForensicClinical Social Worker, CHAMPION, June 1986, at 26, 26-27; David C. Stebbins & Scott B.
Kenney, Zen and the Art of Mitigation Presentation, or, the Use of Psycho-Social Experts in the
Penalty Phaseof a Capital Trial,CHAMPION, Aug. 1986, at 14, 16-17.
38. Alfonso & Baur, supranote 37, at 26-27.
39. Stebbins & Kenney, supra note 37, at 16, 18 (stating that "capital defense attomey[s] must
recognize that the profession demands a higher standard of practice in capital cases").
40. Id.at 16-17.
41. Id. at 17. This point was subsequently stressed in numerous articles on the standard of
care in capital mental health assessments, noting that independently corroborated social history is
the foundation of reliable assessments. See Richard G. Dudley Jr., & Pamela Blume Leonard,
Getting It Right: Life History Investigation as the Foundation for a Reliable Mental Health
Assessment, 36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 963, 966-71 (2008); Douglas S.Liebert & David V. Foster, The
Mental Health Evaluation in Capital Cases: Standards of Practice, 15 AM. J. FORENSIC
PSYCHIATRY 43, 46-48 (1994); George W. Woods et al., NeurobehavioralAssessment in Forensic
Practice, 35 INT'L JL.& PSYCHIATRY 432, 433 (2012); see also Russell Stetler, Mental Health
Evidence and the CapitalDefense Function: PrevailingNorms, 82 UMKC L. REv. 407, 410, 41718 (2014) (noting how the importance of independent corroboration has been acknowledged in the
mental health field as early as the 1980s).
42. James Hudson et al., Using the Mitigation Specialist and the Team Approach, CHAMPION,
June 1987, at 33, 36.
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outset of the case: "Since the penalty phase is always a possibility and
the entire case strategy needs to be planned and prepared around
mitigation, the mitigation specialist
should be obtained as soon as the
43
assigned.
or
retained
is
attorney
Guidance from the Supreme Court stressed the importance of
understanding what shaped the capital client in his developmental years.
Monty Lee Eddings was sixteen when he killed an Oklahoma highway
patrol officer.44 He was certified to stand trial as an adult, and pled nolo
contendere in the district court. 45 Evidence of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances was presented to the trial judge, including extreme
violence inflicted by his father and the young man's emotional
disturbance, but the judge stated that the court, "in following the law,"
46
could not "consider the fact of this young man's violent background."
Following the rule announced in Lockett v. Ohio,47 the Supreme Court
reversed, holding that capital sentencers may not exclude mitigating
evidence from their consideration.4 8 The Court went on to discuss the
special mitigating qualities of youth and the vulnerability of the
developmental years:
The trial judge recognized that youth must be considered a relevant
mitigating factor. But youth is more than a chronological fact. It is a
time and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to
influence and to psychological damage. Our history is replete with
laws and judicial recognition that minors, especially in their earlier
years, generally are less mature and responsible than adults.
Particularly "during the formative years of childhood and adolescence,
minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment" expected
of adults.49

In 1983, Professor Gary Goodpaster published an article, entitled
The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases, that was widely read and frequently cited. 50 He discussed trial
43. Id. at 34.
44. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 105-06 (1982). An amicus curiae brief was filed by
M. Gail Robinson, Kevin M. McNally, and J. Vincent Aprile 11for Kentucky Youth Advocates et
al. Id. at 105 n.*. Mr. McNally was at the beginning of his distinguished career as a capital
defender.
45. Id. at 106.
46. Id. at 107-09.
47. 438 U.S. 586, 616-17 (1978) (finding that sentencing authorities may consider mitigating
circumstances).
48. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114-15.
49. Id. at 115-16 (footnotes omitted) (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979)).
50. See generally Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299 (1983). The article was cited four times in Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-90 (1984); id at 716 nn.13-15, 718 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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counsel's "duty to investigate the client's life, history, and emotional and
psychological make-up" in death penalty cases. 5' He continued:
There must be inquiry into the client's childhood, upbringing,
education, relationships, friendships, formative and traumatic
experiences, personal psychology, and present feelings. The
affirmative case for sparing the defendant's life will be composed in
part of information uncovered in the course of this investigation. The
importance of this investigation, and the thoroughness
and care with
52
which it is conducted, cannot be overemphasized.
Multiple articles in The Champion, the monthly magazine of the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, reiterated these
points in the 1980s, and reflected how the experience of capital defense
lawyers in diverse locations led them to the same conclusions. 53 Other
Champion articles in this period focused on the other myriad
complexities of capital defense representation.54
Justice Marshall referred to the article as "a sensible effort to formulate guidelines for the conduct
of defense counsel in capital sentencing proceedings." Id. at 716 n. 15.
51. Goodpaster, supra note 50, at 323-24.
52. Id.at 324 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court had noted, the year before, that in death
penalty cases "[e]vidence of a difficult family history and of emotional disturbance [was already]
typically introduced by defendants in mitigation." Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115.
53. See, e.g., Dennis N. Balske, The Penalty Phase Trial: A Practical Guide, CHAMPION,
Mar. 1984, at 40, 42 (stating that capital defense counsel "must conduct the most extensive
background investigation imaginable. You should look at every aspect of your client's life from
birth to present. Talk to everyone that you can find who has ever had any contact with the
defendant."); Jeff Blum, Investigation in a Capital Case: Telling the Client's Story, CHAMPION,
Aug. 1985, at 27, 27-28 (describing the methodology for mitigation investigation); Robert R. Bryan,
Death Penalty Trials: Lawyers Need Help, CHAMPION, Aug. 1988, at 32, 32 ("There is a
requirement in every case for a comprehensive investigation not only of the facts but also the entire
life history of the client."); Kevin McNally, Death Is Different: Your Approach to a Capital Case
Must Be Different, Too, CHAMPION, Mar. 1984, at 8, 12 (explaining that capital trials can never be
tried by a lone defense counsel). Another early summary of the contours of mitigation investigation
was published by the National Jury Project and widely circulated at training conferences in the
1980s. See Lois Heaney, Constructing a Social History, in NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, CAPITAL
TRIALS: JUROR ATTITUDES AND SELECTION STRATEGIES

11 (1983).

54. For topics including: voir dire, see John L. Carroll, Voir Dire for Capital Trials,
CHAMPION, Mar. 1984, at 23, 24 (discussing the importance of jury consultants' need to observe
verbal responses, as well as body language); purely legal issues, see Gail R. Weinheimer & Michael
G. Millman, Legal Issues Unique to the Penalty Trial, CHAMPION, Mar. 1984, at 33, 33; defense
closing at penalty phase, see Dennis N. Balske, PuttingIt All Together: The Penalty-Phase Closing
Argument, CHAMPION, Mar. 1984, at 47, 48-49 (noting the need to provide explanation, and stress
each juror's personal responsibility); improper prosecutorial closing arguments, see Margery M.
Koosed, Prosecutorial Misconduct in the Penalty Phase Closing Argument-The Improper
Invitation to Kill, CHAMPION, Nov. 1985, at 40, 40-41 (discussing the importance of recognizing
improprieties and timely objections); jury instructions, see Stephen Ellmann, Instructions on Death:
Guiding the Jury's Sentencing Discretion in Capital Cases, CHAMPION, Apr. 1986, at 20, 20, 22,
24, 28 (noting the importance of instructions in defining aggravation and mitigation, establishing
burdens of proof, and explicating weighing process); federal habeas corpus, see Margery Malkin
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III.

THE ARTICULATION OF STANDARDS

Defendants facing capital punishment have always been poor, so
the practitioners who have developed skills and expertise in effective
capital defense representation have invariably been public defenders,
private counsel appointed by the courts, lawyers at nonprofits that filled
the void in the harshest jurisdictions, and legions of unpaid pro bono
volunteers. Not surprisingly, the first organization to attempt to set out
standards in capital defense was the nation's leading association of
counsel for the indigent, the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association ("NLADA").55 The much larger ABA had previously
published more general standards relating to criminal defense practice,
and these standards already placed important emphasis on the need for
investigation. When the ABA published the second edition of its
"Standards for Criminal Justice (the Defense Function)" in 1980,
Standard 4.4-1 noted: "It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt
investigation of the circumstances of the case and to explore all avenues
leading to facts relevant to the merits of the case and the penalty in the
event of conviction. 56 The Commentary added: "Facts form the basis of
effective representation. 5 7
After a period of years of drafting and circulating preliminary
versions, the NLADA published its "Standards for the Appointment of
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases" in 1985." 8 While the text was
not amended, the name of the document was changed between 1987 and
1988 to "Standards for the Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty
Koosed, FederalHabeas Corpus Relief-Avoiding [a] Comity [of] Errors, CHAMPION, Jan.-Feb.
1987, at 28, 28-29 (recognizing the importance of "constitutionalizing" claims raised in state courts
at trial, on appeal, and in post-conviction); the role of religion in capital trials, see Jeff Blum, The
Ten Commandments of Religious Testimony, CHAMPION, Apr. 1987, at 23, 23 (discussing the pros
and cons of religious testimony); and accomplice liability, see Randall L. Porter, May an
Accomplice Receive the Death Penalty? The Tison v. Arizona Answer, CHAMPION, Aug. 1987, at
24, 24, 28. For articles on intellectual impairment, see George S. Baroff & Stephen C. Freedman,
Mental Retardation and Miranda, CHAMPION, Apr. 1988, at 6, 6-7, John H. Blume, Representing
the Mentally RetardedDefendant, CHAMPION, Nov. 1987, at 32, 32, and Mary Swift, Representing
the Developmentally DisabledOffender, CHAMPION, Apr. 1988, at 10, 10-11.
55. Standards for the Appointment of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases,
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, http://www.nlada.org/Defender/DefenderStandards/
Standards ForDeathPenalty?printable=yes. (last visited Apr. 12, 2015) [hereinafter NLADA
Standards],
56. ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standard 4-4.1 (Supp. 1986) (emphasis
added).
57. Id. Commentary.
58. The Introduction to the Standards for the Appointment of Defense Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases describes how the ABA's Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants
("SCLAID") provided initial support to NLADA as it developed the death penalty standards "over
the course of several years." ABA GUIDELINES (1989), supra note 2, at Introduction.
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Cases" (adopted December 1, 1987, and amended November 16, 1988)
("Standards").59 In February 1988, the NLADA referred its Standards to
the ABA's Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent
Defendants. 60 The Standards were then further circulated within the
ABA, which incorporated some concerns expressed by its Criminal
Justice Section and changed the name from Standards to Guidelines. 6'
The ABA House of Delegates formally adopted the Guidelines at its
1989 Midyear Meeting.62 When the Guidelines were published by the
ABA, each black letter Guideline was explained by a commentary, with
reference to supporting authorities. 63 The Commentary cited some of the
articles that have been mentioned in this Article, 64 as well as capital trial
manuals from multiple jurisdictions, including California,6 5 Indiana,6 6
Kentucky, 67 Ohio, 68 and Tennessee. 69
Thus, the ABA Guidelines were the product of the dedicated
indigent defense professionals, who were representing capital clients
effectively, and who freely shared their knowledge and experience
through The Champion, training programs, and the manuals that
recirculated much of the best material. 70 As the Introduction to the 1989
Guidelines explained: "[T]hey enumerate the minimal resources and
practices necessary to provide effective assistance of counsel., 71 They
were never meant to be aspirational. As the Introduction to NLADA's
original edition said in 1985: "'Should' is used as a mandatory termwhat counsel 'should' do is intended as a standard to be met now, not an
ideal to be attained at a later time." 72 The Introduction also noted the
59. NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Ass'N, STANDARDS FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF
COUNSEL
IN
DEATH
PENALTY
CASES
(1987)
(amended
1988),
available at
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/DeathPenaltyRepresentation/Standards/Na
tional/NLADADP Apptmt Stnd 1987.authcheckdam.pdf.
60. ABA GUIDELINES (1989), supra note 2, at Introduction.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. Guideline 1.1 Commentary, at n.28 (citing Goodpaster, supra note 50).
65. Id. Guideline 11.7.3 Commentary, at n.3 (citing CAL. ATTORNEYS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE/CAL. PUB. DEFENDER ASS'N, CALIFORNIA DEATH PENALTY TRIAL MANUAL (1986)).
66. Id. Guideline 1.1 Commentary, at n.21 (citing IND. PUB. DEFENDER COUNCIL, INDIANA
DEATH PENALTY DEFENSE MANUAL (1985)).
67. Id. Guideline 8.1 Commentary, at n.5 (citing DEP'T OF PUB. ADVOCACY, KENTUCKY
PUBLIC ADVOCATE DEATH PENALTY MANUAL (1983)).
68. Id.Guideline 11.6.3 Commentary, at n.3 (citing OHIO DEATH PENALTY TASK FORCE &
OHIO CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS ASS'N, OHIO DEATH PENALTY MANUAL (1981)).
69. Id. Guideline 11.5.1 Commentary, at n.2 (citing TENN. ASS'N OF CRIMINAL DEF.
LAWYERS, TOOLS FOR THE ULTIMATE TRIAL: TACDL DEATH PENALTY DEFENSE MANUAL (1985)).

70. See generally id.
71.
72.

Id. at Introduction.
NLADA Standards, supra note 55; see also Russell Stetler & W. Bradley Wendel, The
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reality that "poor defendants in this country who face the ultimate
criminal sanction--death-frequently do not receive adequate
representation from their government-supplied lawyers. 7 3
IV.

CONCLUSION: HARDLY A "CADILLAC DEFENSE"

National standards of practice in capital defense are important for
counsel at every stage of representation. Counsel invoke the current
national standards in both pretrial and post-conviction proceedings in
order to obtain adequate time and funding for investigative and
expert services. In post-conviction proceedings, counsel also need to
establish what the national standards were at the time of the original
prosecution, in order to provide courts with an objective means of
assessing trial counsel's performance. As Russell Stetler and W. Bradley
Wendel have explained:
The ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases... continue to stand as the single
most authoritative summary of the prevailing professional norms in the
realm of capital defense practice. Hundreds of court opinions have
cited to the Guidelines. They have been particularly useful in helping

courts to assess the investigation
and presentation of mitigating
74
evidence in death penalty cases.

It is critical to demonstrate to our courts how the Guidelines embody not
a "Cadillac defense," but the minimum standards developed by
successful capital defenders throughout the modern era.
This Article has briefly surveyed the experience that led to the
original Guidelines in 1989.75 However, capital defense practice was not
frozen in time in 1989. This practice is dynamic in every sense, and the
2003 revision reflected continuing advances.76 The more extensive
Commentary that accompanied the 2003 edition,77 with its 357
footnotes, clearly shows the influence of the effective practice from the

ABA Guidelines and the Norms of CapitalDefense Representation, 41 HOFSTRA L. REv. 635, 639
(2013) ("Standards of care in the legal profession ... reflect the judgment of courts concerning what
lawyers ought to do, rather than what a numerical majority of lawyers in fact do.").
73. NLADA Standards, supra note 55.
74. Stetler & Wendel, supra note 72, at 635 (citations omitted); see also ABA, LIST OF CASES
CITING TO THE 1989 ABA GUIDELINES, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
migrated/201 lbuild/deathpenaltyrepresentation/1989ist.authcheckdam.pdf,
ABA, LIST OF
CASES CITING TO THE 2003 ABA GUIDELINES, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/abalmigrated/2011 _build/death_penaltyrepresentation/2003list.authcheckdam.pdf.
75. See supraParts II-III.
76. ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 2, Commentary to Guideline 1.1, at 920-22.
77. Id.
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1990s that contributed to the important revision.78 New York's brief
experiment with capital punishment illustrates how these same
influences shaped the performance of an effective capital defense system
that modeled many of the practices codified in the 2003 revision.79
When New York enacted a death penalty statute in 1995, the
legislation created a Capital Defender Office ("CDO") with a mandate to
ensure that capitally charged defendants received effective
representation. 80 The newly created office was the first of its kind-that
is, the first publicly funded, statewide indigent defense organization
dedicated uniquely to the representation of capitally charged clients.81
The CDO hired staff who had capital experience in other states,
including Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, New Jersey, South
Carolina, and Texas. The number of investigators and mitigation
specialists on staff was roughly equal to the number of trial lawyers.
Every case was staffed with a team of at least two lawyers, an
investigator, and a mitigation specialist. While the statute was
operational, 877 defendants were charged with potential death-eligible
offenses, entitling them to capitally qualified counsel (either CDO staff
attorneys or private attorneys who had received specialized training
through the CDO, and whom the CDO recommended for court
appointment).8 z Only seven death sentences were imposed, and all of
them were ultimately overturned.83 The day-to-day practice of the CDO
was not an idiosyncratic invention of its management, but rather a
78. Seegenerally id.
79. Seegenerallyid.
80. History, CAP. DEFENDER OFF., http://www.nycdo.org (last visited Apr. 12, 2015).
81. Stetler served as the CDO's Director of Investigation and Mitigation from its inception in
1995, until the New York death penalty was abandoned afler the state's highest court found the
statute unconstitutional in People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 (N.Y. 2004). Following the decision,
the State Assembly held five public hearings from December 15, 2004 through February 11, 2005,
and took no steps toward correcting the statutory infirmity, thereby ending the death penalty in New
York. N.Y. STATE ASSEMBLY, THE DEATH PENALTY IN NEW YORK 1-3, 14-15 (2005), available at

http://assembly.state.ny.us/comm/Codes/20050403/deathpenalty.pdf. The details concerning the
CDO discussed herein are based on the author's personal knowledge of its operation.
82. These statistics were maintained by the CDO and reported by the former capital defender
Kevin M. Doyle. E-mail from Kevin M. Doyle, Capital Defender, to authors (Oct. 17, 2012, 5:37
PM) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review).
83. Six death sentences were overturned by the New York Court of Appeals. See People v.
Taylor, 878 N.E.2d 969, 984 (N.Y. 2007); People v. Shulman, 843 N.E.2d 125, 140 (N.Y. 2005);
LaValle, 817 N.E.2d at 368; People v. Mateo, 811 N.E.2d 1053, 1083 (N.Y. 2004); People v. Cahill,
809 N.E.2d 561, 594 (N.Y. 2003); People v. Harris, 779 N.E.2d 705, 728-29 (N.Y. 2002). The case
of the remaining death-sentenced prisoner, Nicholson McCoy, was resolved following the LaValle
decision. See William Glaberson, Across New York, a Death Penalty Stuck in Limbo, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 21, 2004, at Al; Robert Gearty & Bill Hutchinson, Sentenced to Life, Killer Yawns!, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (Sept. 10, 2004, 12:00 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/sentencedlife-killer-yawns-article-1.599385.
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simple attempt to implement the techniques developed by experienced
capital defense practitioners all over the country that were the subject of
regular presentations at national training programs.
The 2003 edition of the Guidelines contains some eighty footnotes
Sandra Babcock,85
citing to the law review articles of David Baldus,84
89
86 John Blume,87 Stephen Bright,88 Randall Coyne,
Vivian Berger,
Phyllis Crocker,9" James Ellis,91 Lyn Entzeroth,92 Eric M. Freedman,93
Ruth Friedman,9 4 William Geimer, 95 Craig Haney,96 Jeffrey
Kirchmeier, 97 James Liebman,98 Ruth Luckasson, 99 Andrea Lyon, 100
Michael Mello, '1 1 Michael Radelet,'1 2 Clive Stafford-Smith, 10 3 Carol
Steiker, 0 4 Jordan Steiker, 10 5 Bryan Stevenson, 06 Scott Sundby, 10 7 Kim
Taylor-Thompson,' 18 Welsh White,' 0 9 and Larry Yackle, l l0 among
others. While most of these authors ultimately had an academic
affiliation, the vast majority also had experience as capital practitioners.
Some two dozen footnotes cited to defense bar publications, such as The
84. ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 2, Guideline 10.10.2, at 1053 n.269.
85. Id. Guideline 10.5, at 1013 n.193.
86. Id. Guideline 4.1, at 959 n. 104.
87. Id. Guideline 10.10.2, at 1051 n.259, 1052 n.261, 1053 n.263; id. Guideline 10.11, at 1062
n.287, 1069 n.317.
88. Id. Guideline 1.1, at 926 n.18, 928 n.29, 964 n.109; id. Guideline 10.10.2, at 1053 n.264.
89. Id. Guideline 10.1, at 991 n.155; id. Guideline 10.11, at 1067 n.305.
90. Id. Guideline 10.11, at 1069 n.315.
91. Id. Guideline 10.5, at 1009 n.183.
92. Id. Guideline 10.1, at 991 n.155.
93. Id. Guideline 1.1, at 935 n.52, 937 n.63; id. Guideline 4.1, at 957 n.99; id. Guideline 10.4,
at 1004 n.174; id. Guideline 10.7, at 1018 n.202.
94. Id. Guideline 9.1, at 985 n.136, 986 n.139.
95. Id. Guideline 1.1, at 930 n.37.
96. Id. Guideline 4.1, at 956 n.93; id. Guideline 10.7, at 1026 n.219; id. Guideline 10.11, at
1060 n.277, 1061 n.278.
97. Id. Guideline 1.1, at928n.29; id. Guideline 7.1,at974n.127.
98. Id. Guideline 1.1, at 928 n.29, 929 n.34, 932 n.46, 936 n.56, 938 n.68; id Guideline
10.10.2, at 1052 n.261.
99. Id. Guideline 10.5 at 1009 n.183.
100. Id. Guideline 1.1, at 923 n.3, 926 n.18; id. Guideline 10.7, at 1016 n.197, 1025 n.215; id.
Guideline 10.11, at 1059 nn.272-73.
101. Id. Guideline 1.1, at931 n.40.
102. Id. Guideline 1.1, at 937 n.64.
103. Id. Guideline 9.1, at 986 n.136.
104. Id. Guideline 10.1 1, at 1059 n.274.
105. Id.
106. Id. Guideline 9.1, at985 n.136, 986 n.139.
107. Id. Guideline 10.11, at 1059 n.273, 1061 n.279, 1062 nn.284-85, 1063 n.288.
108. Id. Guideline 1.1, at 930 n.37; id. Guideline 8.1, at 979 n.130.
109. Id. Guideline 1.1, at 923 n.3; id. Guideline 10.2, at 991 n.155; id. Guideline 10.5, at 1008
n.180, 1009 nn.181 & 185; id. Guideline 10.9.1, at 1041 n.245; id Guideline 10.10.1, at 1047 n.256;
id. Guideline 10.11, at 1061 n.280, 1064 n.292, 1067 n.308, 1068 n.312.
110. Id. Guideline 1.1,at929n.34.
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Champion (published by the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers) and Indigent Defense (published by the NLADA)."' The
authors of these articles were also seasoned practitioners, including John
Blume,'1 2 Stephen Bright, 13 James J. Clark,' 14 Marshall Dayan, 115 Kevin
M. Doyle," 6 Edith Georgi Houlihan," 7 Rick Kammen,' 18 Kevin
122
120
Lee Norton, 121 Michael Ogul,
McNally," 9 Edward C. Monahan,
Russell Stetler, 123 and Mary Ann Tally. 24 Over a dozen other footnotes
2 5 California,'2 6 Florida, 127
referenced the trial manuals of Alabama,
Kentucky, 128 and Texas. 129 There were: a half dozen citations to the
fourth edition of Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure, the
authoritative treatise in this complex area of capital law;130 references to
the major death penalty cost studies by the Spangenberg Group 131 and
U.S. District Court Judge James R. Spencer's subcommittee on the cost
of the federal death penalty; 132 and, notes identifying significant new
111. Id. Guideline 1.1, at 926 n.18, 960 n.108, 1004 n.177, 1008 n.180, 1022 n.210, 1027
nn.224 & 226, 1030 n.227, 1040 n.242, 1053 n.263, 1060 n.275, 1067 n.305.
112. Id. Guideline 4.1, at 956 n.96.
113. Id. Guideline 1.1, at 926 n.18, 928 n.29; id Guideline 5.1, at 964 n.109; id. Guideline
10.4, at 1004 n.177; id. Guideline 10.7, at 1027 n.224; id. Guideline 10.8, at 1030 n.227, 1032
nn.232 & 234, 1033 nn.237 & 240; id. Guideline 10.10.1, at 1048 n.258; id. Guideline 10.10.2, at
1053 nn.264 & 267.
114. Id. Guideline 4.1, at 960 n.108; id Guideline 10.4, at 1003 n.173, 1004 n.177.
115. Id. Guideline 10.10.2, at 1053 n.263.
116. Id. Guideline 10.5, at 1008 n.180; id Guideline 10.9.1, at 1041 n.245.
117. Id. Guideline 10.11, at 1060 n.275.
118. Id. Guideline 10.5, at 1007 n.178, 1010 n.186.
119. Id. Guideline 10.9.1,at 1040 n.242.
120. Id Guideline 10.4, at 1004 n.177.
121. Id. Guideline 10.5, at 1007n.178, 1010n.186.
122. Id. Guideline 10.11,at 1067 n.305.
123. Id. Guideline 4.1, at 959-60 n.105; id Guideline 10.7, at 1022 n.210, 1027 n.226; id
Guideline 10.9.1, at 1042 n.249; id. Guideline 10.15.1, at 1085 n.348.
124. Id. Guideline 1.1, at 926 n.18.
125. Id. Guideline 10.7, at 1022 n.211, 1024 n.214; id. Guideline 10.8, at 1033 n.238.
126. Id. Guideline 10.8, at 1034 n.241; id. Guideline 10.14, at 1077 n.329.
127. Id. Guideline 10.5, at 1009 n.182, 185; id. Guideline 10.7, at 1022 n.21 1.
128. Id. Guideline 10.4, at 1003 n.173.
129. Id. Guideline 4.1, at 960 n. 105; id Guideline 10.4, at 1002 nn. 168 & 170.
130. Id. Guideline 1.1, at 928 n.28 (citing RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 11.2(a), at 482 (4th ed. 2001)); see also id. at 929
n.33, 932 n.45; id. Guideline 10.7, at 1016 n.195; id Guideline 10.10.2, at 1052 n.260; id. Guideline
10.12, at 1075 n.325; id. Guideline 10.15.1, at 1084 n.344.
131. Id. Guideline 1.1, at 932 n.47 (citing THE SPANGENBERG GRP., ABA POSTCONVICTION
DEATH PENALTY REPRESENTATION PROJECT, AN UPDATED ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
AND THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES FNSTATE POSTCONVICTION DEATH PENALTY
CASES (1996)); see also id Guideline 6.1, at 968 n. 118, 969 n. 119; id. Guideline 9.1, at 986-87
nn.138 & 141-42.
132. Id. Guideline 4.1, at 955 n.91 (citing Subcomm. on Federal Death Penalty Cases, Comm.
on Defender Servs., Judicial Conference of the U.S., Federal Death Penalty Cases:
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133
publications relating to mental health issues affecting capital clients.
The notes also fully incorporated then existing jurisprudence, including
many cases in which counsel had been held ineffective for failing to do
what the Guidelines said they were supposed to do. 134 These sources are
precisely the kinds of contemporaneous supporting authorities specified
by Justice Stevens in Padilla v. Kentucky, 135 as reflecting prevailing
professional norms-in
addition to "American Bar Association
136
standards and the like."'
Two abiding principles stand out when we view the Guidelines
from a historical perspective: the centrality of teamwork as a core tenet
in capital defense; and the importance of cooperation among the
successive teams that may represent a capital client over the long life of
the case. Guideline 10.13(D) discusses trial counsel's obligation to
cooperate "with such professionally appropriate legal strategies as may

Recommendations Concerning the Cost and Quality of Defense Representation (1998)); see also id.
at 960 n.107; id. Guideline 6.1, at 968 nn.1 15-16; id. Guideline 9.1, at 986 n.140.
133. Id. Guideline 4.1, at 956 n.93 (citing Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Psychiatric,
Neurological, and Psychoeducational Characteristicsof 15 Death Row Inmates in the United
States, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 838, 839-44 (1986)); id. at 956 n.97 (citing Liebert & Foster, supra
note 41, at 43-64); id Guideline 10.4, at 1007 n.178 (citing Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al.,
Neuropsychiatric, Psychoeducational, and Family Characteristics of 14 Juveniles Condemned to
Death in the United States, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 584, 586-87 (1988)); id Guideline 10.7, at
1026 n.218 (citing TERRY A. KUPERS, PRISON MADNESS: THE MENTAL HEALTH CRISIS BEHIND
BARS AND WHAT WE MUST Do ABOUT IT 33-34 (1999)).

134. See id. Guideline 1.1, at 935 n.53; id. Guideline 10.6, at 1013 n.194; id. Guideline 10.7, at
1016 n.197, 1018 n.204, 1021 n.205-08; id. Guideline 10.8, at 1030 n.227; id. Guideline 10.11, at
1060 n.277, 1061 nn.281-82, 1062 n.288, 1064 n.294, 1067 n.307, 1068 nn.311-12, 1070 n.319; id.
Guideline 10.12, at 1073 n.323. For an explanation of cases of effective assistance gleaned from
public media, see, for example, id. Guideline 1.1, at 935 n.52; id. Guideline 10.7, at 1027 n.226; id.
Guideline 10.9.1, at 1040 n.243; id. Guideline 10.11, at 1063 n.290.
135. 599 U.S. 356 (2010).
136. Id. at 366; see also Stetler & Wendel, supra note 72, at 670-71. Justice Stevens's analysis
in Padilla was endorsed in Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1088 (2014) (per curiam), a capital
case finding counsel ineffective for failing to know current law relating to funding for experts. The
opinion quotes the first two sentences of Justice Stevens's articulation verbatim. Several
commentators have also noted that appellate courts review "the penalty records of only those cases
in which death verdicts were rendered," so that
there is no reason . . . that judges have any special expertise or range of experience in
reaching conclusions about how background and social history actually affect the
life.., of a capital defendant, or the way in which evidence about these factors can
influence the decisionmaking of (especially) life-sentencing capital jurors.
Craig Haney, The Social Context of CapitalMurder: Social Histories and the Logic of Mitigation,
35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 606-07 (1995); see also Sean D. O'Brien & Kathleen Wayland,
Implicit Bias and Capital Decisionmaking: Using Narrative to Counter Prejudicial Psychiatric
Labels, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 751, 760 n.55 (2015) (noting that reasoning based on comparing
strategies of cases that all resulted in death sentences is "analogous to the medical field drawing
performance standards almost exclusively from cases in which the patient died"); accord Stetler &
Wendel, supra note 72, at 676-81.
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be chosen by successor counsel" in post-conviction. 137 In a sense, the
cooperation between successive counsel is no more than a temporal
extension of the concept of teamwork. Capital representation demands
diverse, multidisciplinary teams where the views of every member-past
and present-are valued at every stage of litigation, and where everyone
shares a continuing commitment to high quality representation when a
client's life hangs in the balance.
The Guidelines, as revised in 2003, did not magically emerge from
the word processors of agenda-driven activists or the imagination of
elitist academics. They reflect nothing more than the collective
experience and expertise of the public defenders, court-appointed panel
lawyers, underfunded nonprofits, and pro bono volunteers who had
effectively litigated capital cases in the 1990s. Effective practice
continues to evolve, and, in turn, the lessons of that evolving capital
defense practice continue to be reflected in further applications of the
Guidelines, such as the Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation
Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases, 138 and the efforts of
experts to codify best practices in the pages of the Hofstra Law Review
and elsewhere. Prevailing norms also continue to evolve. 39 It is a tribute
137. ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 2, Guideline 10.13(D), at 1074. However, the need for
mutual respect and cooperation gives rise to a reciprocal duty. There has been increasing
recognition on the part of successor counsel of the need to reach out to predecessor counsel before
raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Tigran W. Eldred, Motivation Matters:
Guideline 10.13 and Other Mechanisms for PreventingLawyers from Surrenderingto Self-Interest
in Responding to Allegations of Ineffective Assistance in DeathPenalty Cases, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV.
473, 485 (2014) (advocating strategies for successor counsel to reduce implicit motivation and bias
in order to facilitate cooperation of predecessor counsel). In his Introduction to Part Two of the
Symposium Issue in which this article appeared, Professor Eric M. Freedman reinforced the need
for thoughtful and candid efforts by post-conviction counsel:
Knowing of the importance of the continuing duty, and the spotty record of prior
counsel in adhering to it, effective successor counsel-who, after all, controls the timing
of the filing of the allegation of ineffective assistance-should reach out to prior counsel
beforehand in order to encourage her to perceive herself as an ongoing member of the
defense team, and if possible, to gain her assistance in framing the post-conviction
claims in a mutually acceptable manner, as Professor Eldred suggests. Under most
circumstances, there is little justification for a scenario in which prior counsel hears of
the ineffectiveness claim for the first time when the prosecutor reads her inflammatory
excerpts over the telephone-a scenario strongly calculated to provoke exactly the set of
counter-productive reactions that successor counsel should be seeking to avoid.
Eric M. Freedman, Introduction: The Continuing Questfor High-QualityDefense Representationin
CapitalCases, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 383, 387 n.39 (2013) (citation omitted).
138.

SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES FOR THE MITIGATION FUNCTION OF DEFENSE TEAMS IN

DEATH PENALTY CASES, in 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677 (2008).
139. Consider, for example, that a great capital defense lawyer of the pre-Furman period,
Clarence Darrow, believed that he could detect jurors' receptivity to mercy based on nationality and
religion. See Ross L. Hindman, Personal and Impersonal Uses of Professional Folklore:
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to the whole capital defense bar that we can expect this process to be
ongoing as long as the ultimate criminal sanction---execution-remains
available in any jurisdiction.

Peremptory Jury Challenges by Lore and in Fact, 8 KAN. J. SOC. 116, 119, 125 (1971) (citing
Clarence Darrow, Attorney for the Defense, ESQUIRE, May 1936, at 36, 36) (noting that Darrow
believed that the Irish were "emotional, kindly, and sympathetic," whereas "[t]here is no warmth in
the Presbyterian"). Compare the great lawyer's approach with what is widely accepted today as best
capital practice. For an explanation of this practice, see generally Matthew Rubenstein, Overview of
the Colorado Method of Capital Voir Dire, CHAMPION, Nov. 2010, at 18, 18. It should be assumed
that today's approach, too, will evolve. Future practitioners may be found ineffective for employing
techniques and strategies that would have been state-of-the-art at a prior time.
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